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A

RETHINKING SOVEREIGN WEATTH FUND IN
GTOBAL PERSPECTIVE - TESSONS FOR NIGERIA

of

internotionol finonciol ond
investment institutions resorted
1o funds from the SWFS to shore
up their bolonce sheet ofter the
finonciol crisis. Sovereign weolth
funds usuolly hove long-term
investment focus. However. their
ob

jectives might include

providing liquidiiy stobilizotion
ITUHAA4N4AD A. ABBA
Reseorch Deportment

CenlrolBonk of Nigeio

I,O

INIRODUCTION

A Sovereign Weolth Fund (SWF)

is

on investment fund owned by o
sovereign stote/notion with the
mondote to invest in finonciol
ossets such os stocks, bonds,
precious metols, property ond
other finonciol instruments. The

structure ond sco pe of
investmenls of q sovereig n
weolth fund depends on the

circumslonces of eoch notion os
well os whot lhe enobling low
setting up the f und permits. The
internotionol Working Group of
Sovereign Weolth Funds defined

os "speciol purpose
investment funds or

SWFs

orrongements thot ore owned by
generol governments". Rozonov
(2005) wos the first to coin the
term sovereign weolth funds, ond
provided the first definition of

these funds. He def ined
sovereig n weolth funds os
" n eith er troditionol public

funds, os well os the funding of
vitol economic infrostructure
projects. Sovereign Weolth Fund
thus, is bosicolly o government's
investment portfolio policy thot
most oil-producing notions hove
odopted in the recent lime to
foce the chollenges of the
future.

Since 20lO there hod been o
consideroble increose in the
number of sovereign weolth
funds ocross the globe ond
especiolly omong resource-rich
countries, however, they hod
been in existence for olmost five

decodes. They hove

metomorphosed from being
considered to be instruments of
wielding internotionol politicol
influence, to very recently os
providers of needed liquidity to
support osset volues ond creote

flnonciol returns in the
developed ond emerging

morket economles. According
to wikipedio.org, the first SWF to
be estoblished wos the Kuwoit
lnvestment Authorily, which wos
estoblished in 1953 before the

country become on

pension funds nor reserve ossets
supporling notionol currencies
but f unds sel up with the following
objectives: insulote the budget
ond economy from exc ess
volo tility in revenues, help
monetory outhorities sterilize
unwonted liquidity, build up
sovings for future generotions, or
use the money for economic ond
sociol development".

independent stole. ll wos set up
with the oim of investing surplus
oil revenues to reduce the
relionce of Kuwoit from its finite
oil resources. Thus, the Fund wos
creoted from crude oil revenues
ond is cunently volued ot obout
three hundred billion US Dollors
($300 billion). Mojority of the
countries thot operote on SWF

According to Poulson (2009) o lot

commodity hove the objective
of using the Fund to stimulote

ond rely on single export

35

non-commodity sectors of the
economy in on effort to diversify
ond reduce relionce on the
dominont export commodity.

ore olso creoted when
governments hove budgelory
surpluses ond hove little or no
internolionol debt. This excess
liquidily is not olwoys possible or
desiroble to hold os money or io
SWFs

chonnel into

im

mediote

consumption. This is especiolly

the cose when o notion
depends on row moteriol

exporis like oil, copper or
diomonds. ln such countries, the
moin reoson for creoting o SWF is
becouse of the properties of
resource revenue: high volotillty

of resource prices,
unpredictobility of extroction.
ond exhoustibility of resources.

Mony economists orgue thot
there is no reoson to believe thoi
investmenls mode by sovereign
weolth funds ore motivoted by
onything other thon seeking ihe
highest rote of return on their

investments. Most sovereign
weolth funds ore set up to be
distinct from their sponsoring
governments to ottempt to
ensure freedom from politicol
interference. Mo.ior sovereign
weolth funds rorely choose to
join the boord of the componies
in which they invest, ond mony
times sovereign weolth funds

intentionolly purchose nonvoting shores in componies to
ovoid public scrutiny. Some
sovereign weolth f unds ore
closely ossocioted with stote

governments, in direct

opposition to the ideo of free
morket copitolism. Sovereign
weolth funds hove bee n
chorocterized os the return of
stote copilolism, o kind of new

mercontilism designed to
protect notionol interests in the

globol economy.

Summers
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(2007), stoted thot the concerns

roised over sovereign weolth
funds ore profound ond go to
the noture of globol copitolism.
Despite the obove contention,
since 2000 the number of SWFs
hos continued to grow in size
ond ossets, obout 50 SWFS ore in
operotion ond ore estimoted to

joinlly control obout

US$3.98

trillion in ossets. Todoy, most if
not oll the emerging economies
of the world hove SWF5, in foct,
prior to the estoblishment of the
Nigerion Sovereign Weolth Fund
'1,
in Moy 201 Nigerio wos one of
the only three OPEC member
stotes thot do not hove o
sovereign weolth fund. Mony
benefits hove been cited os
regords the operotion of the
SWFs, including - budgetory
stobilizotion, sovings for the
f uture, internolionol recognition
for fiscol prudence ond obility to
ottroct world closs investments.
Now, more thon ever before,
resource-rich notions ore being
ossessed one-ogoinsl onother in
terms of the mognitude ond
quolily of their SWFs. lnvesiors

world-wide consider the

existence ond the success of o
SWF in o country os o vitol
component of ec onomic
governonce ond the ottroction
of foreign investments. Also,
occording 1o the Sovereign
Weolth Fund lnstilute (SWFI) "the
negotive effects of 2008 globol
economic meltdown hove left
mony notions looking towords
using the sovereign weolth

funds - to cushion their

economies. Countries now rely
on noturol resource weolth
creoted vio estoblishing SWFs os

economic monogement'best
proctice"'. Also, from the
mocroeconomic perspeclives
sludies hove shown thot seiting
up of SWF moy help reduce
inflotion, lessen exchonge rote
oppreciotion ond improve
tronsporency in the economy.

o result of the growing
importo nce of SWFs, the

those countrles vis-d-vis the
objective of its creotion in

possed into on Act of

the building of strong
inf rostructure, o bsorb
vulnerobility lo commodity
shock ond the need lo

As

Nigerion government proposed
the estoblishment of the Nigerio
Sovereign lnvestment Authority
(NSIA) which wos concunently

porliomeni by the two

legislotive chombers in Moy,
201 l. The NSIA wos to oddress
the iss u es ossocioted wilh
excess liquidity orising from
crude oil soles, thus replocing
the Excess Crude Account
{ECA) which hod long been
considered os on onongement
without legol fromework. Also,
the odministrotion of the ECA
wos considered vulneroble to
politicol orbitroriness especiolly
in the disbursement of the funds

omong the three tiers of
government which olwoys
creote bitterness omong the
federoting units. Therefore, the
estoblishment of the NSIA wos
expected to remedy these
issues, omong others.
However, with the coming of
the NSIA into operotion, there
still seems lo be some misgivlngs

from some federoting

u

nits

obout lhe legolity or otherwise
of the estoblishmenl of the NSIA

os well os its relevonce.

The

current litigotion os it relotes to
the ECA between the Federol
government ond some slole
government hos denied the
NSIA of its projected cosh
streom since the iniliol poyment
of US$ 1.0 billion into the Fund.
Thus, the non-poyment of lhe

estimoted cosh flow could
constroin the NSIA of investing
the funds into whot it wos
designed to ochieve.
The objective of this poper

is

therefore to highlight the

justificotion for the conlinued
existence of SWF in Nigerio,

while ot the some time

exomining SWFs of other (similor
oil producing) notions ond whot
they were creoted to ochieve.
The poper will discuss whot SWFs

were creoted to ochieve
37

in

Nigerio to in porticulor support

tronsform our finite endowment
(oil) inlo on investment for future
growth ond development.

Following this introduction,
section two of the poper
provides o brief review of
litero tu re. Section three
discusses the rotionole for SWFs

with some stylized focts.

The

impoct of SWFs on the economy
is discussed in section four:
section f ive discusses the
significonce of SWFs while, on
overview of other countrles'
SWFs is discussed in seclion six.
Section seven concludes the
poper.
2.0

LITERAIURE REVIEW

The unprecedented
emergence of SWFs os finonciol
ployers hos impelled o debote
omong policymokers, morkel
ployers ond scholors regording
the potentiol risks ond benefits
thot these funds con convey to
the globol economy (Johnson.
2007). The role of SWF5 hos been

widely ocknowledged in this
highly volotile globol finonciol
system dominoted by ris k
oversion, liquidity pressures ond
osset write-downs (Rios-Moroles
& Brennon, 2008). Tomoro
Gomes, (2008) outlines the SWFs
possible impoct on internotionol
f

inonciol stobility ond

concludes thot SWFS ore longterm investors thot con ploy o
stobilizing role in f ino nciol
morkets by supplying liquidity
ond reducing morket volotility.

ln the debote oround the

potenliol risks ond benefits of
the moin concern hos
been the lock of tronsporency
in the odminislrotion ond
investment strotegies of lhese

SWFS,
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colossol funds. A lorge number
of publicotions hove underlined
the donger thot SWFS moy

couse if they remoin
unreguloted (Trumon, 200/o;
Green & Torgerson, 2007;
Redicker & Crebo-Redicker,
2007), suggesting thot SWFs con

oct os vehicles of f uture globol
instobility (Redicker & CreboRedicker, 2007). A number of
publicotions hove emphosised
the need to estoblish on
internoiionol code of conduct
in order to ovoid protectionism
thot would be dehimentol to
the globo lizotion process

(Trumon 2007o, 200b).

In

controst to the obove
perspective, Jen (20070) ond
Kern (2007) hove underlined the

voriety of economic ond
finonciol benefits thot SWFs

lhe topic of SWFs os contributors
of FDI is l;,nited. Nonetheless, the
work of Green & Torgerson
l2oo7), )en (2007b), Siebert
(2002), UNCTAD (2008) ond
Plotkin & Fogon (2009) offer o
bosis for seminol work lo support
our orgument thot by engoging
in FDl. SWFS con susloin the

globol economic growth.
According lo the World

lnvestment Report 2008, SWFs
hove only invested 0.2 percent
of their totol ossets in FDl. About
80 percent of ihis investment
hos token ploce during the
period 2005-2007. The report
olso reveols thot 73 percent wos
invesied in the developed
world moinly in the United
Kingdom, the United Slotes ond
Germony (UNCTAD 2008). Since
these funds olreody represent

presenl. Beside the benefits thot
encomposs os investors,
the IMF (2008) orgues further
thot SWFS con help to ovoid

five killion dollors (UNCTAD,
2008) ond ore estimoted io
reoch the sum of l2 killion
dollon by 2015. (Redicker &

of current

Crebo-Redicker, 2007), SWFs
hove the potentiol to serve os
mojor funding sources in the
globol finonciol system

SWFS

extreme economic cycles,
tronsf er ocross generotions

occounts
ond enhonce revenues of
investors' notions (lMF, 2008).
Nonetheless; this internotionol
institution hos been prominent
in roising the importonce of
estoblishing on internotionol
code of conduct (lMF, 2008).
surpluses

The potentiol risks thot hove
been ottributed to SWFs, hove
been oddressed by the lounch
of the Sonliogo Principles in
October 2008. Thus, there is o
need to focus on the potentiol
benefits thot SWFS con bring to
the globol economy. Although
much hos been written obout
SWFs in recent times, the body
of scholorly reseorch on this

topic is rother sconty.
ossessing

the role of

ln

SWFS os

importont contribulors of FDI in
the globol economy, the
existing substontiol body of
literoture on FDI provides
evidence for the significonce of
FDI os o method of economic
growth. However, reseorch on

(Fernodez &

Bris,

2009).

20I4

monogeriol skills ond
produclion networks
(Blomskom, 2001). Hermes &
Lensink (2003) found lhot FDI hos
o porticulorly positive impoct in

economies with

we ll-

developed finonciol morkets.

porticipotion of SWF in FDI is
novel ond to dote no theories

The

hove been developed to
onolyse ond f orecost the
impoct of these new finonciol
ployers on FDl. However, the
Investmeni Development Poth
Theory (lDP) of Dunning (1998)
offers o bosis for exominotion.
The IDP suggests thot the

mognitude of countries
investment is c orrelo led
positively with the rote of
economic growth.

The IDP model gives speciol
ottention to the government
role in FDI (Dunning & Norulo,
I

992). This theory focuses on the

role of govern menl ond

economic development in
deiermining the pottern of
competitive odvontoges of
foreign investors relotive to
those of locol firms (ownership

lmportonl reseorch hos been
conducted on lhe topic of FDI
os o contribulor of economic
growth. The lorge body of
literoture is not unonimous in
ocknowledging thot FDI is o
direct contribulor of economic
growth. However, reseorch
shows thot FDI hos the potentiol
to contribute to long-term

economic development

(Blomstrom, 2001; Addison ond
Heshmoti, 2003; World Bonk,
2005; Loll. 2005; Dunning,2006).
Reseorchers olso ocknowledge
the foct thot FDI will hove o
positive impoct in the economy

of o country when the

infrostructure of the host country
is reody to receive the so-colled
spillovers of FDI (Borensztein et
ol., 1998. Willem te Velde, 2001).
Spillovers of FDI con benefit the
domeslic economy by bringing

technology, know-how,

odvo ntoges), relotive

of locotionbound resources ond copobility

competitiveness

of the country (locotionol
o dvo ntog es), ond the

propensity of foreign ond locol
firms to utilize the ownership
odvontoges internolly rolher

thon through morkets

(in tern o lizo lion odvontoges).
With o counlry's development
ond governmeni interventions
the configurotion of these

odvontoges chonges ond

reflects

on the

NOIP

country (Dunning
I

&

of the
Norulo,

997). While Dunning suggests

thot the IDP of countries differ
with eoch olher moinly due to
the pottern ond efficocy of
government intervenlions, the
theory should toke this into
occount (Dunning & Norulo,
I 997). Since the estoblishment
of SWFs, ond in mony coses their
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operotion represent

question is controversiol.

o
government intervention, they
moy impoct on lhe IDP of their

Governments moy be oble

to spend the money
immediotely. but risk

countries of origin.

cousing the economy to

3.0

overheot; exomple

STYLIZED FACIS ON SWrs

Venezuelo or Shoh-ero in
lron. In such circumstonces,
soving the money to spend
during o period of low
inflotion is often desiroble.

The lorgest SWFs ore usuolly
designed with one or more
policy objectives in mind. These
objectives include stobilizotion
funds, intergenerotionol sovings

Sovings funds focilitote

funds, ond reserve
monogement funds:
. Stobilizotion funds Stobilizotion SWFs ore
creoled to reduce the
volotility of governmenl

revenues, lo counter the
boom-bust cycles' odverse

eff ect on government
spending ond the notionol

economy os they were
originolly conceived - were

designed to smooth
plonned g overn me n t
budgets. ln principle,
excesS reserves were
occumuloted during o
commodity boom when
prices for o commodity

were

obove

o

predetermined level. These
reserves could theri be
drown down to finonce
government expenditure
when prices foll below this
threshold level. ln proctice,

few if ony of the
stobilizotion funds operole
in this foshion.

Intergenerotionol sovings
funds were designed to
occumulote o portion of
the windfoll revenues in

order to benefit future
generotions ond force

inter-temporol expendilure
smoothing. Sovings SwFs
build up sovings for future
generotions. One such
fund is the Government
Pension Fund of Norwoy. lt is
believed thot SWFs in
resource-rich countries con
help ovoid resource curse,

but the literoture on

this

is

inlergenerotionol tronsf ers,
ollowing future generotions
to benefit from current

fovoroble economic
condilions

Recent SWFs hove been
creoted to eorn o higher return
on foreign exchonge holdings
thon is normolly ossocioted with
troditionol reserve instruments.
Other reosons for creoiing SWFs

moy be economicol, or

strotegic, such os wor chests for
uncertoin times. For exomple,
the Kuwoit Investment Aulhorlty
during lhe Gulf Wor monoged
excess reserves obove the level

needed for cunency reserves
(olthough mony centrol bonks
do thot now). The Government
of S ing o pore lnvestment

20I4

perspectives. However, the
implicotions for osset ollocotion
of lhe requirements thot SWFs

hove ogreed io respect
(through the Sontiogo Principles

ond other ogreements) ore still
o motter of study. The lroditionol
economic opprooch focuses
on the monogement of reserves

(Jeonne ond Roncidre 2008),
models of portfolio choice
(Compbell et ol. 2004) ond
contingency cloims (Alforo ond
Konczuk 2005, Rozonov 2005).

More holistic opprooches
onolyse the motives behind the
estoblishment of eoch type of
fund (Reisen 2008). A recent
literoture on the implicotions of

SWF investments

for

the

internotionol finonciol system is
ropidly growing. Bortolotti et ol.
{2009) ossesses the finonciol
impoct of SWF investments on
stock morkets, siressing some
similorities between SWFs ond

other internotionolly octive

investment vehicles such os
pension funds, buy-oul funds
ond mutuol f unds. They find o
signif ico nlly positive meon

obnormol return upon SWF
ocquisitions of equity stokes in
publicly hoded componies. Sun

Corporotion ond Temosek
Holdings ore portiolly the

ond Hesse (2009) find thot the
onnouncement effect of SWF

expression of o desire lo bolster
Singopore's stonding os on
internotionol finonciol center.
By the virtue of their size ond

investments is positive ond SWF
shore purchoses ore positively

investment strotegies, SWFs ore
liquidity providers ond they
support globol morkets in times
of stress while focilitoting the
groduol unwinding of globol
imbolonces.
4.O

IMPACI OF

SOVENEIGN

WEAI.TH FUND
ECONOMY

ON

IHE

tl.1 lmpocl ol SoYerelgn Weollh
Fund on lhe

CopllolMorkel

o llo co tio n of
Sovereign Weolth Funds hos

The osset

been oddressed fro m

economic, legol, ond politicol
39

ossocioted with obnormol

returns. Bolding (2008) stotes
thol SWFs ocl os economic

driven inveslors ond lheir

impoct on

inte rn o tio no
finonclol morkets moy be more
moderote tho n expected.
Chhoochhorio ond Loeven
(2008) find thot SWFS invest to
diversify owoy from industries ot
home bul do so in countries with
culturol closeness, suggesting
thot investment rules ore not
entirely d rive n by prof it
moximising objectives. In foct,
long-term performonce of firms
ocquired by SWFS tends to be
I

poorer. More recently
Chhoochhorio ond Loeven
(2009 ) show thol other
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institutionol investors olso invest

in

countries with common
culiurol troits. Berstein et ol.
(2009) exomine SWFs' equity

investment strotegies ond their
relotionship to orgonisotionol
structure. They find thot SWFS
where politicions ore involved
ore more likely to invest ot home

thon those where

externol
monogers porticlpote. At the
some time, SWFs with externol
monogers tend to invest in
industries with lower Price-toEornings levels. Fernondes
(2009) focuses on SWF holdings
(rother thon tronsoctions) for
the period 2OO2- 2007, finding

thoi firms with higher SWF
ownership hove higher
voluotions ond better operoting
performonces. ln o componion

poper, Fernondes ond
(2009) find o stobilising

Bris

effecl of

SWF investments on
corporotions. They stress the

positive impocls of SW Fs,
n oto bly through helping

componies reduce their cosl of
copitol. These findings ore
confirmed by other studies on

ihe morket impoct of SWF
investment. Kotter ond Lel
(2008) suggest thot SWFS ore
prof it-oriented possive investors

ond thot m o rkels reoct
positively to SWF investmenl

onnouncements. All in oll. the
evidence suggests thot SWFs
con be o stobilising force in
globol finonciol morkets.
a.2 lmpoct ol Soverelgn Weollh

fund on lniollon,

Exchonge

Roie ond Trontporency

The foct thol eoch sovereign
weolth fund is distinctive in its
objectives, investment portfolio
ond slrotegies, the oveniding
gool is to ensure thot the benefit
from the topping of the noturol
resources ore hornessed in such

o woy lhot the economic
voriobles remoined stoble ond
su p portive to the growth
potentiols of the economy.
Some studies hove exomined

the impocl of sovereign weolth
f unds ;n the ottoinment of
economic growth ond the
stobility of the mo jor
mocroeconomic vorioble of on
economy. Most of the theories
suggested thot the likely impoct
of sovereign weolth fund could
center on inflotion, exchonge
rote, governmeni borrowing
ond ultimotely on reol growth.

A

cunency"

" SWF moy help improve
tronsporency in on
economy - our onolysis
f ound levels
of
tronsporency to be
correloted with meosures of

economic development
such os GDP per copilo ond

the depth of finonciol

morkets. Even when these

octors ore token inlo
occount, however we see
lower levels of perceived
corruption in countries

study by Pricewoterhouse-

f

Coopers (PwC) to understond

whether o SWF hos ony
quontifioble impoct on the host
economy wos corried on

counlries with significont

commodity income. The mojor
findings of the study reveoled
thot:
"Setting up of o sovereign
weolth fund moy help
reduce inflotion, such thot
the presence of o fund is
linked to lower inflotion.
even when we occount for
o number of other foctors
likely to offect inflotion, such
os monetory policy stonce,
the stote of the lobour
morket ond the current

occount bolonce".

20I4

where o Fund

5.0

is

presen1".

THE SIGNIFICANCE OI
SOVEREIGN WEATTH FUND

Sovereign weolth funds ore
esloblished for four principol
reosons.

(i) First. most funds held by
noturol resource exporters

oct os interge nerotio n o
lronsfer mech o nisms,

I

'

where future government
pensions, osset liquidity,
ond fiscol revenues ore
guoronteed by lodoy's
export eornings. When lhe

result is stronger for

country's nolurol resources
ore exhousted, therefore,

surplus" the report

continue to live
prosperously using the
eornings of their

concludes.

forefothers.

"This

commodity rich countries
thon for lhose with o noncommodity bosed trode

"Exchonge role
o p preciotio n moy be
lessened by o sovereign
weolth fund - in countries
with flooting exchonge

rotes we found

o

relotionship between the
presence of o SWF ond o

weoker exchonge rote. The
effect wos equolly strong

for countries with

ond

without commodity weolth.
This moy occur becouse

monies

con be held

in

foreign cunencies (often in
US dollors), so not bidding
up the volue of the locol
40

future generotions con

(ii) Second, most sovereign
weolth lunds of oll country

types ore crected lo
diversify o countrv's
income so thot it con
respond to shocks to the

country's comporotive
odvontoges. When o
country is foced wiih o
competitiveness crisis, it

con coll on its sovereign

weolth fund ossets lo
reinvest in new sectors of
lhe economy thot con

revive the country's
competilive odvontoges.
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(iii) Third, countries

estoblish
sovereign weolth funds to
increose the return on ossets
held in thek cenlrol bonk
reserves. By investing in
securities other f hon U.S. or
Europeon sovereign bonds,
they con roise returns obove
Ihe 3-5% onnuol returns
gornered by most foreign
exchonge reserve holdings.

With ropidly exponding

foreign exchonge stocks in
mony emerging morkets
ond the decline of the U.S.
d ollo r-o n d thus lower

reiurns on dollordenominoted debt-this
desire hos become

increosingly prevolent in

recent limes.

(iv) Fourth, some sovereign
weolth funds. whelher

in

word or proctice, olso seek
to promoie invesiment from
multinotionol corporotions
ond technologicol tronsfer
to domestic industries. To
occomplish this gool, o fund
would hove to ocquire o
mojority stoke in o compony
or form o coolition wiih other
shoreholders. With its voting
power, the SWF con oppoint
corporote boord members
thot could direct o
compony to invest in the
SWF'S home country, ond

especiolly, estoblish

reseorch ond development
focilities there.
On the technology tronsfer end,

these reseorch

ond

development focilities could

produce new lec h nolog ies

under the intellectuol property
regime of the SWF-holding
coun1ry, ollowing it to toilor its
potent lows to f ovor the
disse minotio n of newfound
knowledge to domestic firms.
Only lhose countries seen os

technologicol innovotion in
domestic industries, ond hove

6.0

ovoided mojor investments

KUtlrAlT

U.S.

in

On the other hond, no SWF to
dote hos invested in o compony

for reosons of politicol

"blockmoil" or espionoge. Some
funds, including the Abu Dhobi
lnvestment Authority, hove o
stoted policy to ovoid mojority
stokes in componies due to the
possibility thot such "blockmoil"
could occur. Chino ond Russio,

in oddition, hove both

communicoted to the Treosury
their inlention to ovoid strotegic
purchoses in the nexl five yeors.
Furthermore, oll of lhe top ten
SWFs except the Singopore
lnvestment Corporotion ond
Temosek Holdings hove sioied
thot they do not wish to invest in
sensitive sectors such os oil, gos,

telecommunicotions, ond
Thls,

ogoin,

ovoid ony concerns thot

is

to

SWFs

ore looking to moke investments

for reosons of

-

Kuwoll lnveslmenl

Authority (KlA)

technology firms.

notionol oirlines.

COUNTRYEXPERIENCES

po litic o I
positioning. Chino is even more
sensitive in this regord-in ils $3
billion ogreemenl to toke o
minority stoke in The Blocksione
Group, it reossured Americon
critics of the deol by woiving i1s
shoreholder voling rights. After
the Duboi Ports ond Unocol
debocles, it con thus be seen
thot SWFS hove been quite
coreful lo stoy out of the public
limelight in the United Slotes ond
ocross the world's developed
economies. Finolly, olthough
SWFS ore very secretive in their
investments, there is no record of
SWFs investing in the economies
of "obvious" enemies. As on
exomple, Soudi Arobio hos
mode it policy not to invesl in
lron, while Chino hos privotely
stoted thot il will nol invest in
Toiwon.

The Kuwoit lnvestment Authority
(KlA) wos initiolly estobiished os

the Kuwoit lnvestment Boord in
1953 ond is ihe porent body of
the Kuwoit lnvestment Office
(KlO). The Authority invests in the

locol, Arob ond internotionol
Morkets. The Kuwoit lnvestmeni
Boord wos estoblished when
Sheikh Abdulloh Al-Solem Al

-Soboh d ecided thot oil
revenue could be used to

creote o fund for the future ond
reduce its relionce on o single
non-renewoble resources. The

Kuwoit lnveslment

Of

f

ice

reploced the Kuwoit inveslmenl
Boord in 1963 ond is bosed in
London. The KlO. which is o
globol ond long-term investor,
monoges the Reserve for future
generotion ond the Generol
Reserve Fund. Some of the
objectives of the Office include
thefollowing:
. Moinloin the reol volue of
the funds entrusted to the

office for the

Fulure

Generotion Fund
Achieving o foir return over
the long term

To increose the fovoroble
reputotion os on expert ond
progressive inslituiions in the

internotionol finonciol
morkets

The KIA'S monogement reports
to the Boord of Directors. which
consists of Four ex-of f icio
members ond five members
representing the privote sector,
who ore oppointed by the
Council of Miniters through on
Amiri Decree.
The Kuwoit lnvestment Authorily
ensures thot the Stote of Kuwoit
per cent
oil
tronsfers

"ollies" of the United

l0

Slotes-Toiwon, South Koreo,

of

revenue inlo lhe Reserve for
future generotion on on onnuol

ond Singopore-hove invested in
foreign componies to promote

4l
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bosis. Kuwoit lnvestment

Authority wos instrumentol in
rebuilding the Kuwoiti economy
in the oftermoth of the lroqi
invosion of the country which
sporked

lhe

1990 Gulf Wor. The
Technology Enterprise

Petroleos de Venezuelo SA ond
pr( fiis resulting from its
crude oil operotions constitutes
the moin resource of FEM. The
Fund olso receives revenues thot
ore determined by rules thot the

ony

Notionol
Compony of Kuwoit (NTEC) wos
creoted in 2002, with o stort of
copitol in US$311 million. NTEC is

president hos the power to
regulorly chonge, lhe country
thus, exhibit low levels of
effective governonce. Some of

conduit for the Kuwoil lnvestmenl
Authority.

Mocroeconomic Slobilizotion
Fund of Venezuelo include the

VENEZUETA - FEM

. lt

lhe direcl venlure copitol

the ob.lectives of lhe
following:

Fund for lnvestment of
Mocroeconomic Stobilizotion

wos creoted by the outhority of
the presidency of the Republic os
o result of odvice from the lMF. Oil
revenues obove the reference
price ore tronsferred to the Fund,
which is the moin source of
funding. lf the oil prices drop
below the reference price, the
Fund tronsfers revenues to the

treosury to substitute the
revenues it would oiherwise hove
received if oil prices hod been
stoble.

in

countering the
'Dutch Diseose'. This is
ochieved by sterilizin g

The 'Mocroeconomic

Stobilizotion Fund' which is olso
known os FEM wos estoblished in
I 998. FEM, which tronslotes to the

oims

excess eornings from exports
by keeping lhem outside the

domestic economy

. To increose
tronsporency
.

the
of

lro nsoctio ns reloted to
Venezuelo's oil weolth.

To stimulote nonof the
economy in order lo
commodity seclors

diversify ond reduce the
counly's relionce on the

dominont
.

export

commodity, which is oil.
Assisting with the budget
plonning ond oddresses
issues such os flunctuotion of
p ric es in internotionol
community morket.

The regulotion of the fund by the

Boord

of the Centrol Bonk

of
Venezuelo slorted in December,

1999. The Boord ensures
complionce, opproves onnuol
operoting budgets, issues internol

regulotions, opproves
expenditures, opproves onnuol
fund reports, estoblishes polices

ond ensures thot the
functions os they

Fund

desire.

The

legislotive hos limited

involvement with ony decisionmoking powers over the Fund,
nor does it hove on oversight role.

The mojority of the decisionmoking powers lie with the
president os he mokes
expenditure decisions from the
Fund by

decree.

The revenue generoted from

UNIIED ARAB EMIRAIE - Abu
Dhobl lnYeslment Aulhodty
The country is currenlly counted
os one of the most progressive in

the entire world. Until the mid20th century, lhe economy of
Abu Dhobi wos mointoined by
comel herding ond production
of dotes ond vegelobles. Fishing

ond peorl diving were

olso

engoged during summer time.

However, things chonged
completely ofter lhe city struck
oil, in the yeor 1958 ond goined
independence in I 9Zl . The UAE
hos one of the lorgest Sovereign
Weolth Fund (SWF) in the world
with over US$620 billion under
monogement of lhe Abu Dhobi
Investment Authority (ADIA).
Founded in 1976, the source of
the fund is primorily from the oil
weollh of the Emirote of Abu
Dhobi. According to ADIA's 2009
"to
invest funds on beholf of the
Government of the Emirote of
Abu Dhobi to moke ovoiloble
Review. ADIA'S sole mission

is

the necessory f inonciol
resources to secure ond

moinioin the future welfore of
Emirote". A robust ond

the

discerning investment

powerhouse, highly sought ofter

GABON

Since 1998. The Gobonese
Republic hos o reserve occount
ot the Bonk of Centrol Africon
Stotes (BEAC), which is known os
Fund for future generotions. The
Fund wos renomed in 2010 os
the Founds Souveroin de lo

Republique Gobonoise(
Sovereign Fund of the

Gobonese Republic). Ten ( l0 )
per cent of the country's oil
revenue projected in the
budget ore tronsfened to the
Fund onnuolly. The Fund olso
portokes in 50 per cent of

revenue obove budget

mplions. The Fund is
monoged by the Bonk of

ossu

Centrol Africon Stotes (BEAC).
42

in fund investor portfolios, ADIA is
o truly globol operotion with only

30.0 per cent of its 1,200 stoff
from the UAE,35 per cent from
Asio ond 12 per cent from
Europe. ADIA does not invest in
the UAE or Gulf region. With o
substontiol SWF ond o gross
notionol income (GNl) per
copitol of $1 1.906, Emirote of
Abu Dhobi con offord not to

invest

in their region.

UAE's

hod helped
build its copitol. Abu Dhobi,
which is the second lorgest clty
in the emirotes.
investment of

its SWF
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QAIAR
Authodly

2

Volume 38 No 4

Qolor lnveslment

Qotor lnvestment Authority (QlA)
wos esloblished in 2005 by virtue
of the Emiri Decision No (22) of

2005 os on independent
government investmeni
institution ond went into

operoiion in eorly 2006. QIA is
wholly owned ond subject to
supervision by the Government of
the Stote of Qotor ond pursuont
to Article (2) of QIA\ constituent
inslrument, nomely soid Emiri
Decision, QIA hos o legol
personolity ond o budget, both of
which ore independent of those
of the Government of the Stote of
Oolor.

to its constitutive
instrument, QIA'5 ob.lectives ore
1o develop, invest, ond monoge
the stote reserve funds ond other
property ossigned lo it by the
Government vio the Supreme
Council of Economic Affoirs ond
According

lnvestments. The o bove
menlioned Emiri Decision
endowed QIA with required

copocity, powers, ond

competences to oct in fulfilling its
itotutory mondote ond ochieve
its objectives. QIA'S Boord of
Directors is the supreme body,
hoving full control over its offoirs
ond the dischorge of its business.
RUSSIA

-Ihe

Reserve Fund

The Reserve Fund (RF) ond
Notionol Weolth Fund (NWF)
were estoblished in occordonce
with the omendments to the
Budget Code, the federol low of

the Russion Federotion,
opproved in 2007. The initiol
tronsfers to the

ond NWF were
executed on Jonuory 30. 2008,
from the Stobilizotion Fund of the
Russion Federotion, whereupon it
ceosed to exist. As of thot dote
the size of the RF ond NWF totoled
US$125.40 billion ond US$31 .98
billion. respectively. As of August
I , 2008, lhe RF totoled US$l 29.58
billion ond the NWF totoled
RF

APRIL

US$32.69 billion. The RF hos
reploced the Stobilizotion Fund.
The objective of lhe RF is to
ensure thot the federol budget
expenses ore finonced ond the

federol budget bolonce

is

mointoined. ln cose the omounl
of oil ond gos revenues is not
suf

f

icient for the budget

purposes, on odditionol omount

could be withdrown from the RF.
The RF could olso be used for

eorly stole f oreig n debt
repoyment in complionce wiih
the federol budget low for the
conesponding fiscol yeor. The
omount of the RF is limited lo l0
percent of GDP. Thot meons
thot this sum is sufficient to meet

future budget obligotions

in

cose of unfovoroble conditions
for o period of ot leost three
yeors.
The objeclives of the NWF ore

to

co-finonce volunlory pension

of ihe Russion citizens
ond to mointoin the budget
sovings

bolonce of the Pension Fund of
the Russion Federotion. The NWF
ossets could not be used for ony
other purposes. The budget
proceeds from the minerol
extroclion tox ond export duties
on oil, gos, ond oil products ore
occounted seporotely f rom
other proceeds to the budget.
As ihe oil ond gos proceeds ore
withdrown from the budgel the
ortificiol budget deficit oppeors.
The oil ond gos proceeds in
excess of the tronsfer ore to be
chonneled to the RF until its
omount reoches l0 percent of
GDP. lf ofter oll there is on
excessive omount of oil ond gos
revenues, then it will be
chonneled to the NWF. The
Ministry of Finonce of the Russion
Federotion monoges the RF ond
NWF. The primory investment
objective of the RF ond NWF is to
ensure sofety of the ossets ond
stoble level of return.

AUSTRALIA - The

-

DECEMBER 20 4

tuture Fund

The country hos o sovereign
weolth fund known os the Future
Fund. The Future Fund Act 2006
(the ActJ commenced on April
3, 2006, ond estoblished the
Future Fund Speciol Account
(the Fund Account), the Future
Fund Boord of Guordions (the

Boord) ond the Future Fund
Monogement Agency (the

Agency), colleclively referred to
os the Future Fund. The object of
the Act is to strengthen lhe

Commonweolth's long-term
finonciol position. The Fulure
Fund will moke provision for
unfunded superonnuotion
liobilities thoi will become
poyoble during o period when
on oging populolion is likely to
ploce significont pressure on the
Commonweolth's finonces. The
legislotion quorontines the Fund,
the bolonce of the Fund
Account ond other investments,
for the ultimote purpose of

paying

unf unded

superonnuotion liobilities ond
expenses ossocioted with the
investment ond odministrotion
of both the Boord of Guordions,
ond by direct tronsfer from the

odministered funds, the
expenses of the Future Fund
Monogement Agency.

The Future Fund is controlled by

on independent Boord

of

Guordions thol is collectively
responsible for the investment
decisions of lhe fund ond is
occountoble to the Austrolion

Government for the
sofekeeping ond performonce
of fund ossets. The Future Fund

Monogement Agency

is

responsible for the development

of recommendotlons to the
Boord on oppropriote
investment strotegies ond forthe
lmplementotion of these
strotegies. ln the 2008-09
budgets, lhe Au tro lio n
Government onnounced thot
the Future Fund Boord of
s

z.crrIII?A[ BANK OF t '
Litsi?ARY

*"
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Guordions

ond

Monogement
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Agency would be given

odditionol res po n sibility for
monoging the investment of
three odditionol specific purpose

funds thot the governmenl
proposes to estoblish to support
expe n ditu re on educotion,
heolth, ond infrostructure.

MEXICO - Oll Revenue
3loblllzollon Fund

ln 2000, ihe Oil Revenues
Stobilizotion Fund wos
constituted wit h o risk
monogement purpose

in
response to the observed oil price
decreoses thot led to unplonned
budget cuts in the lote I 990s. The
objective of the Fund is to lessen
the effects on public finonces of

chonges

in the level of

oil

revenues derived from sudden

in internotionol oil
prices. The Fund's inflow comes
from o speciol levy on oil
revenues ond 40 percent of
voriotions

excess revenues, when the

observed oil price is higher thon
the one set in the budget. Also, it
hos on upper limit defined by the
level of oil production plotform.
The resources of the Fund ore
used to compensote for o
decreose in estimoted income
from the levies of the reloted
fiscol yeor derived from o lower
observed oil price, using up to 50

of the occumuloted
resources ot the end of the
previous the fiscol yeor for thot
purpose. The operotion of the
Fund ond the ollocotion of
resources ore oudited by the
percent

Superior Auditor of the

Federotion, ond reports ore sent
lo Congress on o quorterly bosis.

CHlt{A

-

increose wiihin the lost decode.
the govlrnment estoblished ils

sovereign weolth fund, ihe
Chino lnvestment Corporotion
(ClC) on September 29, 2007
with US$200 billion in iniliol
copitol. The CIC is one of the
lorgest sovereign weolth funds
(SWFs) in

lhe world.

The investmenis by the CIC ore

commerciol bosed, seeking to
moximize relurn on investment.

Chlno lnveslmenl

Chino provides onother clossic
exomple of SWF. For mony yeors,
Chino's ropid export growth hos
coused it to occumulote on ever
growing reserve thot reoched
US$ I .5 trillion by 2007. As o

consequence

of the

CONCTUSTON

The study hos reveoled thot the

globol rise in the operotion of
sovereign weolth funds in o
number of commodity ond noncommodity exporting counties
hos been of tremendous
mognitude. The foct thot, most,
if not oll the oil exporting
countries of the world todoy
hove SWF cleorly confirms the
mony benefits of hoving o

Since its creotion, the CIC ond its

sovereign weolth f und.

subsidiories hove mode severol
investme nis, inc lu din g the
purchose of 9.9 per cent of the

Resource-rich countries ore olso

U.S. f inonciol firm, Morgon
Stonley in 2007. The CIC wos
creoted to improve the rqte of
return on Chino's $ L5 trillion in
foreign exchonge reserves ond
to sook up some of the notion's
excess finonciol liquidity. Chino's
economy is ropidly growing ond

coupled with its foreign

exchonge reserve ond the lorge
SWF, Chino soves todoy to
consume even more in the
future. lts high sovings role
reflects whot economists coll
"precoutionory soving" ogoinst
o downturn. The CIC is o semi

independent,

quosi-

governmentol investment firm
estoblished by the Chinese
government to invest o portion
of the notion's foreign exchonge
reserves. CIC hos to poy
dividends to the Stote Council os
its owner, to cover the cost of
these speciol treosury bonds.

The CIC reporis directly to

Chino's Stote Council,
conferring it with the equivolent

stonding
purpose

of o ministry. The
of the CIC is to

moximize return of occeptoble

Colporoilon(ClC)

7.O

20I4

ond toleronce
ond improve the corporote
governonce of key sto terisk toleronce

owned finonciol institutions. CIC
is subject to finonciol supervision
by the Ministry of Finonce ond
periodic externol ouditing by the
N otio no Auditing by the
Notionol Audil Office.

ropid
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being judged ogoinst one
onother in respect of the size
ond quolity of their Funds by
internotionol investors os on
importont component of good
governonce in the ottroction of
Foreig n Direct lnveslme nt.
Anecdolol evidence hos olso

confirmed thot

some

economic-reloted impocts moy
orise from o country hoving o
sovereign weolth funds, which

includes o country belng
insuloted ogoinst inflotion, f unds

reducing government
borrowing ond lim it in g
exchonge rote oppreciotion.
For Nigerio the lesson from other

resource rich countries thot
hove estoblished SWF is very
cleor, os ot todoy no country
thot hod emborked on the
project hod ever obondoned it
or hod o rethink obout its
significonce. The current
deboie ond especiolly the

litigotion

obout its

constitutionolity should give woy
to the overollobjective forwhich
it wos designed to ochieve in the

oreos of investing in
infrostructure (which we hove
huge def icil), economic

stobilizotion fund ond sovings for
future generotion. The fund will
olso be oble to curtoil the cycle

of

spending blnge by office
holders orising from revenues

coming from high oil prices
resu

lting in "windfoll"

ond

bringing some negotive impoct
- profligocy.
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